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Non-technical summary  
 
The last couple of years have seen an increasing interest in critical loss analysis, both, in 
academia and in practice. This development is documented by various research papers, 
high-level exchanges between antitrust experts as well as an increasing number of case 
decisions – in the United States as well as in Europe – which make use of some form of 
critical loss analysis.  
 Generally, critical loss analysis is considered as one empirical method to investigate 
the closeness of competitive interaction triggered by supply-side and demand-side 
substitution. The critical sales loss is the decrease in sales resulting from a particular 
price increase that is just large enough so that a hypothetical monopolist or a merged 
entity, respectively, would not impose a price increase of at least that amount. If the 
actual loss following such a price increase is found to be less than the critical loss, the 
price increase would pay; otherwise it would not.  
 In this context, it is the aim of this article to describe the general method of critical 
loss analysis, to assess important properties of the concept, to show how critical loss 
analysis has to differ between market definition exercises and the evaluation of the 
competitive effects of horizontal mergers and to discuss applications of critical loss 
analysis in recent cases.   
As a general result it can be said that an application of critical loss analysis in practice 
is often not as straightforward as the presentation of the general theoretical concept 
might suggest. In fact, the method has to be applied with great care in order to receive 
meaningful results. On the one hand, it is shown that the critical loss might be sensitive 
to changes in the calculation method as well as the underlying demand and cost 
functions. On the other hand, the success of a critical loss analysis critically depends on 
the accuracy of the estimation of the actual loss. As indicated by both high-level 
theoretical exchanges (sketched partly in Section D.) and the review of two recent 
antitrust cases (sketched in Section E.), this often turns out to be the key challenge in a 
critical loss analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
In den vergangenen Jahren hat die Bedeutung von sogenannten Critical Loss Analysen 
in der Wettbewerbspolitik deutlich zugenommen – dies gilt sowohl für das 
wissenschaftliche als auch für das praktische Umfeld. Diese Entwicklung lässt sich 
beispielsweise ablesen an der Veröffentlichung verschiedener Arbeitspapiere, 
Diskussionen zwischen Wettbewerbsexperten sowie einer ansteigenden Anzahl an 
Fallentscheiden – sowohl in den Vereinigten Staaten als auch in Europa – die auf die 
Durchführung einer Critical Loss Analyse explizit Bezug nehmen.   
 Grundsätzlich ist die sogenannte Critical Loss Analyse eine empirische Methode zur 
Untersuchung der Intensität (angebots- und nachfrageseitiger) wettbewerblicher 
Interaktion. Unter dem Critical Loss wird dabei diejenige Reduktion der abgesetzten 
Menge in der Folge einer Preiserhöhung verstanden, die gerade groß genug ist, um diese 
Preiserhöhung für einen hypothetischen Monopolisten oder die fusionierenden Parteien 
unprofitabel werden zu lassen. Wenn nun der Actual Loss kleiner als der Critical Loss 
ist, so würde sich ein Preisanstieg lohnen, andernfalls würde er sich nicht lohnen.    
Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es das Ziel dieses Beitrags, die generelle Methode der 
Critical Loss Analyse zu beschreiben, wichtige charakteristische Elemente des Konzepts 
zu identifizieren, Unterschiede in der Anwendung des Konzepts bei der 
Marktabgrenzung und der wettbewerbspolitischen Einschätzung der unilateralen Effekte 
von horizontalen Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen zu verdeutlichen sowie einige 
praktische Anwendungen des Konzepts in Wettbewerbsfällen zu diskutieren.  
Als zentrales Ergebnis kann festgehalten werden, dass eine Anwendung der Critical 
Loss Analyse keinesfalls so einfach ist wie das überschaubare theoretische Konstrukt 
vermuten lassen mag. Tatsächlich sollte das Konzept nur mit großer Vorsicht 
angewandt werden um aussagekräftige Ergebnisse zu gewährleisten. Auf der einen Seite 
wurde in diesem Zusammenhang gezeigt, dass die Höhe des Critical Loss sowohl von 
der Berechnungsmethode als auch von den Ausprägungen der jeweiligen Nachfrage- 
und Kostenfunktionen abhängt. Auf der anderen Seite wurde verdeutlicht, dass der 
Erfolg einer Critical Loss Analyse steht und fällt mit der Genauigkeit der Abschätzung 
des sogenannten Actual Loss. Theoretische Diskussionen zwischen 
Wettbewerbsexperten (skizziert in Abschnitt D.) sowie die Betrachtung zweier 
praktischer Wettbewerbsfälle (skizziert in Abschnitt E.) zeigen, dass darin oftmals die 
zentrale Herausforderung in der Anwendung einer Critical Loss Analyse besteht.    
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A. INTRODUCTION 
The question of which factors constrain a firm from raising its price is at the heart of 
antitrust policy. In almost every market definition exercise or horizontal merger 
investigation, this question has to be answered in order to come to meaningful 
conclusions on the relevant market or the competitive effects of a proposed merger.   
The size of the reduction in demand following a price increase – and therefore the key 
constraint which might hinder firms to raise their price – is determined by two factors: 
supply-side substitution and demand-side substitution. On the supply side, competitor 
firms which offer (or could offer) products which are (or would be) considered as 
substitutes constrain the behaviour of a firm. On the demand side, reactions by 
customers to price increases limit the market power of a firm as consumers might 
reduce their demand (lost sales per customer) or even decide not to consume the product 
at all (lost customers) in response to an increase in price.  
 In this context, critical loss analysis is considered as one empirical method to 
investigate the closeness of competitive interaction triggered by supply-side and 
demand-side substitution. Generally, the critical sales loss is the decrease in sales 
resulting from a particular price increase that is just large enough so that a hypothetical 
monopolist or a merged entity, respectively, would not impose a price increase of at 
least that amount. If the actual loss following such a price increase is found to be less 
than the critical loss, the price increase would pay; otherwise it would not.  
 The most common applications of critical loss analysis are the definition of relevant 
market and the assessment of unilateral effects in horizontal merger investigations. With 
respect to market definition, critical loss analysis helps to answer the question raised by 
the ‘small but significant non-transitory increase in price’ (SSNIP) test. With respect to 
horizontal mergers, critical loss analysis can help to assess the question whether and to 
what extent the merged entity can use its increased market power to increase prices 
post-merger.  
     Against this background, it is the aim of this article to describe the general method of 
critical loss analysis (Section B.), to assess important properties of the concept (Section 
C.), to show how critical loss analysis has to differ between market definition exercises 
and the evaluation of the competitive effects of horizontal mergers (Section D.), to 
discuss applications of critical loss analysis in recent cases (Section E.), and, finally, to 
come to some general conclusions for its meaningful application in antitrust analysis 
(Section F.). 
B. DEFINITION AND ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS 
In general, an increase in price has two opposing effects on profits. First, it increases the 
margin and thereby has a positive effect on the change in profits. However, second, it 
typically leads to a reduction in demand thereby reducing the number of sales for which 
the higher margin can be realised causing a negative effect on the change in profits. 
Overall, a price increase is profitable as long as the former effect tops the latter effect.1  
 In this context, the critical sales loss is defined as the decrease in sales resulting from 
a particular price increase that is just large enough so that a hypothetical monopolist or a 
                                                          
1  Technically, the effect of a reduction of demand on production costs would need to be taken into 
account as well.   
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merged entity, respectively, would not impose a price increase of at least that amount. 2 
If the actual loss following such a price increase is found to be less than the critical loss, 
the price increase would pay; otherwise it would not. This basic characterisation of the 
method already indicates that critical loss analysis has to be conducted in three steps: 
The derivation of the critical loss (first step), the estimation of the actual loss (second 
step), and the comparison of the critical loss with the actual loss (third step). All three 
steps are described in the following.  
1. First Step – Derivation of the critical loss 
In the first step of a critical loss analysis, the critical loss must be derived. Based on the 
general definition given in the preceding paragraph, the standard critical loss can be 
derived formally as follows:3 
Before the price increase the profits are given by 
  .QcP 000   (1)
After the price increase the profits are given by 
  .QcP 111   (2)
If 01 PPP   and 01 QQQ   is defined, the profits after the price increase can be 
expressed as follows 
  .QQcPP 001   (3)
To calculate the critical loss, the question has to be answered by how much the price 
can increase without realising a lower profit level: 
.0 0101   (4)
Inserting (1) and (3) into (4) leads to 
    .QQcPPQcP 0000   (5)
Rearranging (5) leads to 
.
cPP
P
Q
Q
00 
  (6)
Adding ((1/P0)/(1/P0)) on the right side of (6) leads to the following expression 
   .PcPPP
PP
Q
Q
000
0
0 
  (7)
If XPP 0   and    MPcP 00   is defined, the critical loss formula is given by 
.
MX
Xlosscritical
Q
Q
0 
  (8)
                                                          
2  An alternative definition is the following: “The Critical Loss is the level of lost sales at which the 
group of producers is indifferent between raising the price and not raising the price i.e. where it has a 
negligible impact of profits”; C Veljanovski, “Quantitative Economic Techniques in EC Merger 
Control”, Case Associates Working Paper (2004), 12.  
3  A similar derivation of the standard critical loss formula can be found in D O’Brien and A 
Wickelgren, “A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis”, FTC Working Paper (2003), 9-10.   
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Equation (8) basically says that the critical percentage loss of units sold is determined 
by the percentage change in price divided by the sum of the percentage change in price 
and the (gross) margin.  
 For given values of X and M it is straightforward to formally derive the critical loss. 
If the margin is, for example, given by M = 10% and the percentage change in price is 
assumed to be X = 5%, the critical loss is 0.33 or 33%: 
.33.0
10.005.0
05,0
MX
XCL   (9)
This calculation can be replicated for various combinations of values for M and X. 
Figure 1 plots the critical losses of such a matrix for price changes of 5% to 30% against 
margins of 10% to 80%. 
 
Fig. 1. Critical losses for different margins and price changes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 basically shows that the critical loss increases with the price change X and 
decreases with the margin M. For example, while a margin of 80% at a price change of 
5% would lead to a critical loss of 5.88%, a margin of only 40% would increase the 
critical loss to 11.11%. Furthermore, while a price change of 5% at a margin of 40% 
would result in a critical loss of 11.11%, a price change of 10% at a margin of 40% 
would lead to a critical loss of 20%. This general result is also intuitively 
comprehensible: With high margins, the loss of a few customers will already have a 
significant impact on profitability while with low margins, more customers need to be 
lost in order to impose the same impact on profitability.  
Although the derivation of the critical loss is arithmetically a straightforward 
exercise, in practice, the accuracy of the calculation depends to a great extent on the 
quality of the used data. In this respect, Froeb4 urges that the critical loss should not be 
derived by simply using whatever the involved parties in a certain antitrust case call 
their margins. In order to receive meaningful results, disaggregated revenue and cost 
data needs to be collected in order to compute the margins suitable for critical loss 
                                                          
4  See L Froeb, “Regression Analysis & Market Delineation”, Presentation at the ABA Spring Meeting 
(2008).   
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analysis. In particular, as argued by Gaynor et al. 5 , the use of accounting data to 
calculate margins allows for discretion in the classification of fixed versus variable costs, 
since the analyst must use his own judgment in making the distinction between fixed 
and variable costs. “Specifically, there exists an incentive [for companies] to classify a 
large portion of their costs as fixed. As a larger portion of costs are classified as fixed, 
this forces measured variable costs to be low and thus results in the determination of a 
high contribution margin.”  
Additionally, it might not always be straightforward to derive a market price (or an 
aggregated form of industry output, respectively) that can enter the critical loss analysis 
right away. Even in relatively homogeneous markets, different package sizes, rebates or 
distribution channels etc. might complicate such an undertaking. This problem is 
aggravated when products become increasingly differentiated. As long as differentiation 
is not a key market characteristic, it might be acceptable to combine products together 
for a critical loss analysis; however, such a simplification would not be acceptable in 
markets in which product differentiation is too extensive to allow a meaningful 
aggregation of outputs.6 In such cases, standard critical loss analysis is unlikely to result 
in reliable results (see Section D. below for recent research in this respect).  
2. Second Step - Estimation of the actual loss  
The derivation of a critical loss as such specifies how much substitution must occur as a 
consequence of a price increase in order to make that price rise unprofitable. In a second 
step, information must be collected to investigate to what extent such a demand- and 
supply-side substitution would actually take place in the case at hand. Such a ‘real’ or 
‘actual’ loss can be defined as the percentage loss in unit sales predicted to result from a 
hypothetical price increase.  
There are several ways to deduct information on the size of the actual loss. Harkrider7, 
for example, generally differentiates between information about customer reactions to 
historical price changes, econometric evidence, customer interviews and affidavits as 
well as surveys. Customer interviews may, for example, provide information about 
specific customers or customer groups who would (or would not) switch to a substitute 
in case of a certain price increase. However, as reminded by Coate and Fischer8, simply 
claiming that some customers are unwilling to switch is insufficient evidence as it does 
not show that other customers will not respond to a price increase (and therefore 
probably make the price increase unprofitable).  
Although customer interviews as well as the other forms of qualitative evidence 
might help to answer the question of how many customers would switch in response to 
a hypothetical price increase, critical loss analysis typically aims at quantifying critical 
and actual losses with disaggregated sales and costs data and makes use of the available 
qualitative evidence for reality checks of the obtained results.9   
                                                          
5  M Gaynor, S Kleiner and W Vogt, “A Structural Approach to Market Definition: An Application to 
the Hospital Industry”, Carnegie Mellon University Working Paper (2006).  
6  See MB Coate and JH Fischer, “A Practical Guide to the Hypothetical Monopolist Test for Market 
Definition” (2008) 4 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 1041. 
7  See J Harkrider, “Operationalizing the Hypothetical Monopolist Test”, Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider 
LLP Working Paper (2004). 
8  Coate and Fischer, supra n 6, 1042. 
9  In this respect, it is important to remark that both demand- and supply-side substitution should be 
taken into account in the calculation of the actual loss. However, most methods proposed above focus 
on demand-side substitution raising the question whether supply-side aspects are systematically 
disregarded in standard critical loss analysis. This might have to do with the fact that the SSNIP test in 
 5
An obvious starting point of attempts to actually quantify the actual loss is to estimate 
the own-price elasticity of demand own. Starting from its general definition for a given 
product – own= (% change in quantity demanded / % change in price) – a simple 
rearrangement of the equation delivers a first expression for the derivation of the actual 
loss (for a linear demand curve): Actual loss = % change in price * own. An application 
of the equation is straightforward. For example, in case of a 5% price increase and an 
estimated elasticity of 1, the actual loss would be 5%. Generally, the equation shows 
that the higher the price elasticity of demand, the higher is the actual loss in the event of 
the assumed price rise and vice versa. 
 Although the own-price elasticity certainly is a key factor in the estimation of the 
actual loss, it misses an important other driver by ignoring the cross-price elasticities of 
demand:10 A price increase for a product A not only causes the unit sales of product A to 
fall by the amount of the price increase times the own elasticity of demand, but also 
causes the unit sales of a product B to rise by the amount of the price increase times the 
cross elasticity of demand. Assuming symmetric products A and B, an X % increase in 
the price of product A causes the unit sales of product A to fall by X*Eown % and the 
unit sales of product B to rise by X*Ecross %. Combining these effects, a price increase 
of X % for both products A and B causes a reduction in the unit sales of X*(Eown - 
Ecross) % for both products. Therefore, the actual loss in percentage terms experienced 
by a hypothetical monopolist from an X % price increase is given by: Actual Loss = 
X*(Eown - Ecross).  
 In practice, elasticities are best estimated by observing the impact of price changes 
on unit sales. However, such exercises typically not only require the availability of 
detailed price, cost and sales data, but also sufficient time to undertake the analysis. As 
a consequence, approximation methods are frequently used. One possible method is to 
make use of the well-known theoretical relationship that shows that the Lerner index 
   MpcpL   is equal to the inverse of the firm’s demand elasticity iD1  . 11  This 
relationship directly allows the derivation of the firm’s price elasticity of demand by 
estimating the price-cost margin M.12 Although this method looks like a simple and also 
practical instrument to estimate the demand elasticity, it unfortunately has several well 
documented general theoretical and practical drawbacks.13 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the US mainly focuses on demand-side substitution. However, the respective guidelines in the EU 
basically demand the inclusion of supply-side substitution at market definition level (and not only 
later in the case as part of an analysis of the competitive effects generally and the role of market entry 
barriers in particular). See also K Hüschelrath, Competition Policy Analysis – An Integrated Approach 
(Heidelberg, Springer, 2009), 165.  
10  Following O’Brien and Wickelgren, supra n 3, 3-4, cross-price elasticities must be included in the 
estimation of the actual loss independent of the exact aim of critical loss analysis (market definition or 
merger control): “In the ‘hypothetical monopolist test’ outlined in the Merger Guidelines for defining 
markets, the hypothetical monopolist always controls multiple products. The question of whether a 
price increase would be profitable cannot be answered without accounting for the cross elasticities 
among the products under the monopolist’s control. Similarly, since a merger alters the set of products 
under a firm’s control, the analyst must account for cross elasticities when assessing the profitability 
of a post-merger price increase.” 
11  This relationship can be derived by simply rearranging a basic result of monopoly theory which shows 
that a firm with market power maximises profit when   c11p iD  . 
12  See generally M Motta, Competition Policy – Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 124.  
13  From a theoretical perspective, George Hay expresses the concern that focusing on the Lerner index 
could easily lead to a general condemnation of firms with a high Lerner index value irrespective of the 
fact that they might have ‘deserved’ their high margins by offering superior products and not by 
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 Interestingly, a current economic debate centres on the question whether accounting 
margins and the Lerner relationship should be used to estimate the actual loss.14 While 
some commentators argue that the introduction of such simple models of market 
behaviour is long overdue in critical loss analysis, others are of the opinion that the 
Lerner equation oversimplifies real world pricing behaviour and will not offer guidance 
in market definition.15 Those commentators find it superior to instead draw inferences 
about elasticity from qualitative evidence such as consumer surveys and industry expert 
opinions.  
 Without wanting to enter into a detailed discussion, more sophisticated tools to 
estimate the price elasticity of demand for differentiated product markets are available. 
One possibility is to construct a full demand system for all interrelated products. As the 
available data typically does not allow the estimation of all own- and cross-price 
elasticities, econometric theory keeps ready several models to tackle this 
‘dimensionality problem’ by way of introducing specific assumptions and restrictions. 
While a Logit approach factually assumes that elasticities are proportional to market 
shares, the almost ideal demand system (AIDS) involves a model in which products are 
‘nested’ together in order to allow an estimation of the cross-price elasticities within 
these groups.16 A further technique often applied in practice is an estimation of the 
elasticity of the residual demand function.17 The residual demand function is the demand 
function a single firm faces once the supply responses of all other firms are taken into 
account.   
3. Third Step - Comparison of critical loss with actual loss 
After deriving the critical sales loss and estimating the actual sales loss, both have to be 
compared in a third step. Is the actual loss in the market smaller than the critical loss, 
the increase in price would be profitable, otherwise it would not. It is obvious that the 
reliability of the conclusions drawn in the third step critically depend on the accuracy of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
abusing their market power. See G Hay, “Market Power in Antitrust” (1991) 60 Antitrust Law Journal 
814. Furthermore, an often-reported, related problem of the Lerner index refers to its reliance on 
perfect competition as the competitive benchmark. This assumption is typically critical in industries 
where ‘substantial’ fixed costs are incurred (for activities such as research and development in, for 
instance, pharmaceutical and software industries) and therefore ‘substantial’ price-cost margins are by 
no means a general indicator of market power but might simply be required to cover the substantial 
amounts of fixed costs. See K Elzinga, “Unmasking Monopoly: Four Types of Economic Evidence” 
in R Larner and J Meehan (eds), Economics and Antitrust Policy (New York, Quorum, 1989), 27. In 
order to make the Lerner index a meaningful measure in such environments, an appropriate alternative 
competitive benchmark would need to be fixed in the first place to allow a differentiation between 
‘margins realised to cover fixed costs’ and ‘margins realised due to the abuse of market power’. 
14  See J Schmidt, “Critical Loss Analysis: A Merger Lawyer’s View”, Presentation at the Fall Forum of 
ABA Section of Antitrust Law (2007).  
15  Baker argues that price-cost margins commonly provide limited information about the magnitude of 
the likely buyer response to an increase in price and therefore should not be used to draw conclusions 
about the demand elasticity. See J Baker, “Market Definition: An Analytical Overview”, American 
University Working Paper (2006), 35.  
16  See generally American Bar Association, Econometrics: Legal, Practical and Technical Issues 
(Chicago, ABA Publishing, 2006) for an in-depth characterisation of the econometric techniques and 
D Rubinfeld, “Market Definition with Differentiated Products: The Post-Nabisco Cereal Merger” 
(2000) 68 Antitrust Law Journal 163-185, for a practical application of the AIDS model to the 
breakfast cereal industry on the occasion of the Post-Nabisco cereal merger in the United States. 
17  See generally J Baker and T Bresnahan, “Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single 
Firm” (1988) 6 International Journal of Industrial Organization 283-300; Motta, supra n 12, 124-
134.  
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the analysis in the first two steps. The implications of the comparisons for market 
definition and merger control are investigated in more detail in Section D. below. 
C. IMPORTANT PROPERTIES OF CRITICAL LOSS ANALYSIS 
Although the basic concept of critical loss analysis is straightforward, some caution in 
its application in antitrust cases is appropriate. As it will be shown in the following, the 
critical loss for a certain margin/price-change combination can be sensitive to changes 
in the calculation method as well as the underlying demand function. Additionally, an 
understanding of the underlying cost structure needs to be developed to receive 
meaningful results out of a critical loss analysis.      
1. Calculation method  
The standard critical loss is derived by answering the question whether a hypothetical 
monopolist could raise its price by a certain percentage value above the initial price P0 
without realising a lower profit level than in the initial situation. It was shown above 
that under such a could-approach, the critical loss can be calculated to CL=(X/(X+M)). 
However, such an approach does not answer the question whether the new price P1 is 
the profit-maximising price for the monopolist or whether he has an incentive to either 
further raise or alternatively to lower the price in order to maximize its profit.  
Consequently, an alternative way to calculate a critical loss is the so-called would-
approach. Under such an approach, the question is asked whether a hypothetical 
monopolist would raise price a certain percentage above the initial price (because it is 
the profit-maximising price increase). As shown by Baumann and Godek18, such an 
approach requires, first, the calculation of the profit maximising price and second, a 
comparison of that price to the initial price. If a linear demand function is assumed, it 
can be shown that the critical loss under a would-approach is given by 
CL=(X/(2X+M)).19 Figure 2 plots the critical losses (would-approach) for price changes 
of 5% to 30% against margins of 10% to 80%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18  M Baumann and P Godek, “Could and Would Understood: Critical Elasticities and the Merger 
Guidelines” (1995) 40 Antitrust Bulletin 894-899. 
19  For the proof, see G Werden, “Demand Elasticities in Antitrust Analysis” (1998) 66 Antitrust Law 
Journal 410-414. 
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Fig. 2. Critical losses (would-approach, linear demand function) for different margins 
and price changes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparing Figures 1 (could-approach) and 2 (would-approach) show that although 
the shapes of both planes are similar, the plane levels differ considerably. The could-
approach systematically leads to higher critical loss values than the would-approach. 
The implications of this finding are further clarified by Figure 3 below which plots the 
differences in percentage points between the could-approach and the would-approach20 
for variable margins and the three most commonly used price increases: 5%, 10% and 
15%. 
 
Fig. 3. Critical loss difference between could- and would-approach (linear demand 
function) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20  The basic idea of plotting the difference between could- and would-approach is taken from Baumann 
and Godek, supra n 18, 891. However, in their article, Baumann and Godek make use of critical 
elasticities instead of critical losses. Generally, it is easily possible to derive critical demand 
elasticities instead of critical losses. For example, the corresponding ‘critical demand elasticity’ 
equation to the ‘critical loss’ Equation (8) can be calculated to (1/(M+X)). See generally Werden, 
supra n 19. 
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Figure 3 shows, first, that the could-approach leads to systematically larger critical loss 
values than the would-approach. Second, it shows that the difference between could- 
and would-approach is largest for small margins and is reduced with growing margins. 
Third, Figure 3 clarifies that the difference between could- and would-approach is 
increasing with growing percentage price increases.  
 Summing up the analysis in this section it can be said that the choice of the 
calculation method matters most in investigations in which either industries with 
relatively low margins and/or the effects of relatively large price increases are 
investigated.   
2. Underlying demand function  
A further attribute of the critical loss is that it can react sensitively to changes in the 
underlying demand function. In Section B., it was shown that for a linear demand 
function, the critical loss is given by CL=(X/(X+M)). The preceding section showed 
that this is in fact only true if the break-even method is chosen to calculate the critical 
loss. The profit-maximisation approach would instead lead to a smaller critical loss 
given by CL=(X/(2X+M)). 
Besides linear demand functions, several other functional forms of demand are 
frequently used in antitrust economics. For example, the critical losses for iso-elastic 
demand functions can be substantially different from the critical losses derived for 
linear demand functions. Table 1 shows the critical loss formulas for linear and iso-
elastic demand functions under the two different approaches ‘would’ and ‘could’.21  
Table 1. Critical loss formulas with respect to chosen approach and demand function 
Approach 
Demand function 
Profit-maximisation 
(would-approach) 
Break-even 
(could-approach) 
Linear 
MX2
XCL   MX
XCL   
Iso-elastic  
  XM
X1
X11CL 

  
 
MX
XCL   
As shown in Table 1, the critical loss formulas derived by applying the could-
approach are identical for linear and iso-elastic demand functions. 22  However, the 
would-approach leads to different critical loss formulas for the two types of demand 
                                                          
21  For the proofs, see Werden, supra n 19, 410-414. 
22  This characteristic might explain why the could-approach is favoured in practical applications of 
critical loss analysis. However, following Baumann and Godek, supra n 18, 891, “[t]he would-
elasticity generates a given percentage price increase, where price is determined by profit 
maximization. For the sake of theoretical integrity, it would seem better to know what the hypothetical 
monopolist would do, not what it could do without reducing profits below the initial level.” 
Furthermore, as added by Langenfeld and Li, if the break-even critical loss is applied for various price 
increases it is thinkable that the results will show that two or even more price increases are profitable 
and therefore a profit-maximizing critical loss analysis would have to solve the question which price 
increase is the most profitable. See J Langenfeld and W Li, “Critical Loss Analysis in Evaluating 
Mergers” (2001) 46 Antitrust Bulletin 334-337. If critical loss analysis is applied in a merger control 
context, however, the analyst might be interested most in the optimal price increase post-merger in 
order to come to a conclusion whether the merger has anticompetitive potential. 
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functions. While for the linear case, the critical loss is given by CL=(X/(2X+M)), it can 
be shown that for an iso-elastic demand function, the critical loss is given by 
  XM
X1
X11CL 

 . Figure 4 below plots the critical losses (would-approach) for an iso-
elastic demand function and price changes of 5% to 30% against margins of 10% to 
80%.  
Fig. 4. Critical losses (would-approach, iso-elastic demand function) for different 
margins and price changes 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparing Figures 2 and 4 (would-approach) show that the shapes of the planes are still 
similar, however, that the plane levels again differ considerably. The would-approach 
with an iso-elastic demand function systematically leads to higher critical loss values 
than the would-approach with a linear demand function. Furthermore, a graph 
comparable to Figure 3 above which plots the differences in percentage points between 
the could- and would-approach with an iso-elastic demand function for variable margins 
and the three most commonly used price increases (5%, 10% and 15%) would show that 
the sensitivity of the critical loss (in low M regions) between could- and would-
approach is considerably smaller for iso-elastic demand curves than for linear demand 
curves.   
 Generally, the analysis in this section so far has shown that the choice of the 
calculation method as well as the underlying demand function matter most in cases of 
relatively small margins. This would allow the conclusion that – if the observation of 
Katz and Shapiro23 is correct that observed (gross) margins are often in the 50 % range 
or even larger (at least in industries with large fixed costs and/or highly differentiated 
products) – these properties of critical loss analysis should not have a huge influence on 
the results of a critical loss analysis.  
In addition to the choice between linear and iso-elastic demand functions, critical loss 
analysis might generally be challenged by discontinuous demand functions. For 
example, single kinked demand curves can be observed if a product has two distinct 
uses one in which demand his relatively elastic and one in which the demand is 
relatively inelastic. Such a kinked demand curve can have the unpleasant characteristic 
                                                          
23  See M Katz and C Shapiro, “Critical Loss: Let’s Tell the Whole Story” (2003) Antitrust Magazine 50.  
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that small price increases might not be profitable, however, larger price increases might 
very well be profitable.24 A stylised example is shown in Figure 5.  
 
Fig. 5. Kinked demand curve and price changes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 5, in case of a kinked demand curve a price increase from P0 to P1 
would not be profitable (indicated by a comparison of the sizes of the two respective 
rectangles representing the ‘higher margin’ and the ‘lost margin’ profit effects), 
however, a larger price increase from P0 to P2 would lead to an increase in profits. 
Generally, the latter situation occurs as soon as the hypothetical monopolist or the 
merged entity would find it profitable to sacrifice all sales to customers with elastic 
demand in order to be able to exploit customers with inelastic demand. In such cases, 
applying standard critical loss analysis might lead to misleading results (i.e. they 
underestimate the incentives to increase price and therefore lead to broader markets than 
they actually are). However, the problem can be avoided by explicitly modelling the 
hypothetical monopolist or merged entity as facing demand from multiple sources with 
differing elasticities.25 Generally, it can be concluded that it is advisable to conduct 
critical loss analysis for various price increases to check for possible anomalies.  
3. Underlying cost function  
In addition to the calculation method and the functional form of demand, a third area of 
potential concern in critical loss analysis is the underlying cost function. As shown 
above, the standard critical loss formula technically needs to estimate marginal costs in 
order to be able to derive the margin that enters the calculation. However, as marginal 
costs are hardly observable in practice, a first typical approximation is to replace 
marginal costs by average variable cost. Depending on the respective firm 
characteristics, this approximation might already lead to an underestimation of the 
critical loss as long as the marginal cost curve lies above the average variable cost 
(AVC) curve in the relevant area of output. Furthermore, as already described in Section 
B. above, it might not be straightforward in practice to come up with a good estimate of 
                                                          
24  For the proof, see Langenfeld and Li, supra n 22, 334-337. 
25  See G Werden, “Beyond Critical Loss: Tailoring Applications of the Hypothetical Monopolist 
Paradigm”, EAG Working Paper 02-9 (2002), 6.  
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average variable costs either due to, for instance, possible problems to differentiate 
between variable and fixed costs.  
 Additionally, another potentially critical assumption of standard critical loss analysis 
is that the marginal cost curve (or the average variable cost curve, respectively) is flat, 
i.e. the marginal costs are identical for both relevant levels of output (Q0 and Q1). 
Already the critical loss pioneers Harris and Simons26 were aware of this potentially 
critical assumption; however, saw no suitable alternative given their key aim of 
practicability and the anticipated difficulties in getting a reasonable estimate of marginal 
or average variable cost at the new output level. Nevertheless, in case it is possible to 
estimate the respective cost function, critical loss analysis could take account of the 
effect of changing AVC by adjusting the standard critical loss formula (could-approach, 
linear demand) to the following expression: 
1AVCXPP
AVCAVCXPCL
00
100

  (10)
Equation (10) shows that the critical loss estimate now also depends on the average 
variable costs in the pre- and post-price increase state. In case of AVC0=AVC1, 
rearranging equation (10) leads to the standard critical loss formula derived in Section B. 
above.   
 Acknowledging the potential importance of the underlying cost function for critical 
loss calculations, Coate and Williams aim at deriving a generalized critical loss formula 
incorporating a more generalized cost structure. In particular, they are looking for an 
appropriate way to convert between accounting measures of average costs and actual 
marginal costs. In a first step, they define the general critical loss in a homogeneous 
market with a linear marginal cost function (with a positive slope) and the assumption 
that pre-merger prices equate to marginal cost at the competitive level of output. The 
results show that the critical loss now depends on the assumed price increase and the 
elasticity of marginal costs. However, given the observation that the formula results in 
several cases in which the required loss would push the linear marginal cost function 
below zero, Coate and Willams continue their search for a more sophisticated cost 
model. “Such a model would allow marginal cost to equal average variable cost for a 
range of output values but then increase linearly so the standard market equilibrium 
could be generated.”27 Revisions of the initially obtained formula with respect to the 
average marginal cost function and several manipulations lead to the following final 
critical loss formula in the generalized form 
 XAVCM2
AVCMX2CL 0
MC
20
MC

  (11)
with 0MC  representing the elasticity of marginal costs and AVCM standing for the 
average variable contribution margin (P0-AVC)/P0. For a given price increase X, a data 
matrix of critical losses could be constructed for any combination of average variable 
contribution margin and marginal cost elasticity. Taking these results of Coate and 
Williams into account, it can be concluded that the standard critical loss formula derived 
above is only likely to offer reasonable results if short run marginal costs play little role 
                                                          
26  B Harris and J Simons, “Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is Necessary?” (1989) 
12 Research in Law and Economics 212-215. 
27  M Coate and M Williams, “Generalized Critical Loss for Market Definition”, Potomac Working Paper 
05-01 (2005), 13. However, as discussed by Werden, supra n 25, it is also thinkable that either 
marginal costs differ across units of capacity (i.e. there are kinks in the marginal cost curve) or that 
fixed costs are avoidable by shutting down capacity (i.e. there are kinks in the total cost curve). In 
both cases, standard critical loss analysis is unlikely to offer reasonable results.  
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in driving competition in the respective market (if, for instance, the market faces tight 
capacity constraints or the evidence suggest that market participants consider long run 
issues when setting prices). 
 Summing up the whole paragraph, it was shown that an understanding of the most 
suitable calculation method as well as the underlying demand and cost functions needs 
to be developed in order to derive meaningful and reasonable results from an 
application of critical loss analysis in a certain antitrust case.28 
D. KEY APPLICATIONS OF CRITICAL LOSS ANALYSIS 
Critical loss analysis has two major areas of application in antitrust policy: Market 
definition and horizontal merger control. The particularities of both areas will be 
assessed in the following two paragraphs.  
1. Market definition 
Defining markets is not about studying real phenomena but rather must be understood 
as an instrument to reduce the complexity of market interaction. In the words of 
Geroski29, “[m]arket definitions are a way of intellectually organising the way we think 
about the economic activity we observe, and are not inherent in the nature of things”. 
Although there may be measurable relationships between a lot of different products 
(reflected in non-zero cross-price elasticities), identifying the relevant market is about 
identifying the most ‘substantial’ and ‘relevant’ of these relationships. In particular, 
market definition serves as a pre-requisite for identifying “… those actual competitors 
of the undertakings involved that are capable of constraining their behaviour and 
preventing them from behaving independently of an effective competitive pressure”.30 
Under the assumption that economic power exercised by firms is typically 
transformed into elevated prices, the key for the derivation of antitrust markets lies in 
getting an understanding of what factors constrain the pricing behaviour of firms. From 
a firm perspective, a price rise is profitable as long as the increased price charged on the 
new lower quantity Q1 is greater than the lost margin on the decrease in quantity ΔQ:  
Q
P
CPQ
P
P
0
00
1
0
 . (12)
It follows that the decrease in quantity caused by a price increase is the basic constraint 
a firm faces. If the actual decrease in quantity is large following a small increase in 
                                                          
28  Horwitz identifies further situations in which the standard critical loss formula needs to be changed. 
One occurs where there is a by-product created by the production of the product in the candidate 
market from which revenues are derived. Another occurs if the reduction in the supply of the product 
in the candidate market allows an increase in the production of other products. A third example 
involves licensing fees where there are ‘feedback’ effects possible because of the existence of 
licensing agreements which may attenuate the lost profits due to the lost sales caused by the 
hypothesised higher price. Another challenge of critical loss analysis is the possibility of price 
discrimination. Although standard critical loss analysis can basically be applied in such an 
environment, it needs to take account for ‘diversions’ between price discrimination categories. See RB 
Horwitz, “The Use of Critical Loss in and Beyond Merger Analysis” (2002) 2 Clayton Act Newsletter 
6. 
29  P Geroski, “Thinking Creatively about Markets” (1998) 16 International Journal of Industrial 
Organization 678.  
30  European Commission, Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the Purposes of 
Community Competition Law, OJ C 372 [1997].   
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price, it is likely that the ‘lost margin’ effect overcompensates the ‘higher margin’ effect 
and – as a consequence – the respective price increase would be unprofitable. 
The consequential follow-up question which needs to be investigated is what factors 
determine the decrease in quantity following a price increase? On the demand side, 
customers switching to alternative goods and customers looking for the same good in 
new geographic areas might lead to the unprofitability of a certain price rise. On the 
supply side, rivals starting to produce a substitute and rival firms looking for new 
geographic areas to sell their products in the event of a price rise constrain the price-
setting behaviour of the firm (by providing switching alternatives to consumers).   
Based on this initial characterisation of the basic competitive constraints – supply and 
demand substitutability – the small but significant non-transitory increase in price test 
(the SSNIP test) has become the standard technique to identify the relevant antitrust 
market. The SSNIP test starts with a small candidate market containing one or a narrow 
set of products and asks whether a hypothetical monopolist controlling the product(s) in 
this hypothesised market could raise prices profitably and permanently (i.e., at least 
twelve months) by a significant amount (i.e., usually 5-10%). If the answer is Yes, the 
(set of) product(s) in the candidate market represent a well-defined market, because the 
constraints by other products on the price-setting behaviour of the hypothetical 
monopolist are too weak to make the price increase unprofitable. If, however, the 
hypothetical monopolist in the candidate market cannot raise the price (profitably and 
permanently) by, for example, 5%, this speaks for an effective constraint of its 
behaviour by the considered next-best substitute, and it should therefore belong to the 
same relevant antitrust market. This procedure of adding potential substitutes 
(downward sorted by assumed substitution potential) has to be continued until a product 
is added which does not hinder the hypothetical monopolist to raise its price 
permanently and profitably by 5%. This product remains in the candidate market and 
the relevant market is constituted. Consequently, following this methodology of the 
SSNIP test, the relevant antitrust market is defined as the smallest collection of products 
with which a hypothetical monopolist could extract and maintain some degree of market 
power (here 5% above the competitive price). 31 
It is often argued that standard critical loss analysis can directly be used to answer the 
question of the SSNIP test: If a hypothetical monopolist would not be able to profitably 
increase price because the actual loss would be larger than the critical loss, this implies 
that the relevant market should be wider than the goods in the candidate market. 
Subsequently, the next closest substitute needs to be included in the candidate market 
until the price increase would be profitable and the market therefore is defined.  
Although critical loss analysis was in fact developed to assist in the definition of the 
relevant market and certainly can be very helpful in this regard, economic research and 
actual applications in antitrust cases have shown that its implementation is not always as 
straightforward as suggested by the short description provided in the preceding 
paragraph. This has partly to do with the fact that the implementation of the SSNIP test 
itself faces several challenges which are carried forward to the critical loss method as 
implementation vehicle of the SSNIP test. Although it cannot be the aim here to cover 
all of these challenges, a few key arguments are described a little further in the 
following.  
                                                          
31  It should at least be mentioned here that the SSNIP test and critical loss analysis can be used for the 
definition of the geographical market as well. See especially N Strand, “A Simple Critical Loss Test 
for the Geographical Market” (2006) 2 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 697–707.  
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First, as demonstrated by Filistrucchi32 and others, the exact SSNIP question slightly 
differs between the EU Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers and the US 
DOJ Merger Guidelines. According to the former, the SSNIP test is implemented by 
first simulating a given price increase above the current competitive level by a 
hypothetical monopolist which owns just one product and, as long as that leads to 
estimated losses in profits, progressively increasing the number of products owned by 
the monopolist. However, according to the US guidelines, the SSNIP test is 
implemented by first simulating the optimal price increase above the current 
competitive level by a profit maximizing hypothetical monopolist and, as long as that is 
at least a small but significant non transitory increase, progressively increasing the 
number of products under control of the hypothetical monopolist. As shown in Section 
B. above, both approaches can differ especially in cases of relatively low margins.  
Second, in both merger guidelines, the question remains open (on all but the first 
step) whether one should raise just the price of the first product taken into consideration 
or should raise the prices of all products owned by the hypothetical monopolist at each 
step in the procedure of enlarging the candidate market. Oxera33 has put more thought 
into this question and argues that the aim of the SSNIP test is to find the smallest market 
worth monopolising and therefore the SSNIP test should be applied iteratively by 
adding further substitutes, however, the price increase should be imposed on the first 
product only. Daljord, Sørgard and Thomassen34 also address this issue and remark that 
standard critical loss analysis typically assumes that the products are symmetric in price 
and cost, and only focuses on a uniform SSNIP imposed on all products in the candidate 
market. As in practice, however, a hypothetical monopolist might well want to raise 
some prices more than others, they argue that in cases in which evidence suggests that 
such asymmetries might play a role, critical loss analysis has to either adapt to these 
changes or should be replaced by other methods to define the relevant market. 35  
Third, the role of cross-price elasticities in critical loss analysis for market definition 
purposes seems to be disputed.36 Generally, the assumption of a hypothetical monopolist 
suggests that all non-zero cross-price elasticities are already taken into account and that 
the answer to the SSNIP question solely relies on the own-price elasticity of demand. 
However, as already mentioned in Section B. above, at least some scholars argue that 
cross-price elasticities have to play a key role in the estimation of the actual loss in both, 
                                                          
32  See L Filistrucchi, “A SSNIP Test for Two-sided Markets: The Case of Media”, Tilburg University 
Working Paper (2008), 4-9. 
33  See generally Oxera, “The SSNIP test: Some Common Misconceptions”, Competing Ideas Bulletin 
(2005).  
34  Ø Daljord, L Sørgard and Ø Thomassen, “The SSNIP Test and Market Definition with the Aggregate 
Diversion Ratio: A Reply to Katz and Shapiro”, forthcoming Journal of Competition Law & 
Economics. 
35  See also J Farrell and C Shapiro, “Improving Critical Loss Analysis” (2008) Antitrust Source 2.  
36  In a recent paper, Daljord clarifies this difference between both approaches by differentiating between 
an Actual Loss from an All-Price Increase and a Stand-Alone Critical Loss Test. In case of a linear 
demand function, the stand-alone actual loss for both products can be calculated by the formula 
mentioned above including the relevant cross-price elasticity or diversion ratio, respectively: Actual 
loss = X*(Eown - Ecross). If both products satisfy the stand-alone critical loss tests, it can immediately be 
concluded that the price increase is profitable, and conversely, if both products fail the stand-alone 
critical loss test that the price increase is definitely not profitable. However, if one product satisfies the 
stand-alone test, while the other fails, the results of the two tests must be weighted in order to come to 
a conclusion. See Ø Daljord, “An Exact Arithmetic SSNIP Test for Asymmetric Products”, 
forthcoming Journal of Competition Law & Economics. 
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market definition and merger control. 37  Again Oxera 38  tries to clarify the issue by 
arguing that the SSNIP test asks whether a certain price increase for a certain product 
(constituting the initial candidate market) is profitable. The answer depends on any sales 
that the hypothetical monopolist loses as a result of a price increase and not only on the 
sales he loses to the next closest substitute.39  
From a theoretical perspective, the SSNIP test is based on a given demand system 
that in theory covers all goods and services in an economy and in which the demand for 
a certain product depends on its own-price elasticity, the own price, the prices of all 
other products and the disposable income of consumers. In such a demand system the 
sensitivity of the demand for each product can be measured by the respective elasticities. 
As soon as all these elasticities have been measured, the answer to the SSNIP solely 
depends on the own-price elasticity of the initial product. Only if it is found that the 
price increase is not profitable, the cross-elasticities are helpful in guiding which is the 
next closest substitute and should enter the candidate market next.40  
Fourth, given the discussion about the role of cross-price elasticities, the broader 
question of how to estimate the actual loss in a market definition exercise needs to be 
addressed. As already mentioned in Section B. above, some scholars propose to start 
from the simple relationship AL=X*own with X representing the percentage increase in 
price and combine it with the Lerner condition which directly leads to the following 
expression: AL=X/M.41 If it is now assumed that the hypothetical monopolist imposes a 
uniform SSNIP on all of the products in the candidate market, it will recapture a fraction 
Z of the sales lost by any one product when its price is raised because these lost sales 
will be diverted to products owned by the hypothetical monopolist. As a consequence, 
the actual loss of a price increase by the hypothetical monopolist is given by AL=(1− 
Z)*X*ε=(1− Z)*X/M. Therefore, it can be concluded that the products in the candidate 
market form the relevant market if and only if this expression is less than the critical 
loss given by X/(X+M). This inequality can be simplified to Z≥X/(M+X) basically 
saying that as long as the so-called aggregate diversion ratio Z is larger than the critical 
loss, the actual loss is less than the critical loss and thus a hypothetical monopolist 
would find a SSNIP profitable.42 
Fifth, in direct connection to this approach to estimate the actual loss, a frequently 
mentioned methodological problem of critical loss analysis in market definition 
exercises is its potential for misuse. Starting from the SSNIP question, the standard 
critical loss formula suggests that if the margin is large, critical loss will be small. As a 
                                                          
37  See especially footnote 10 above.  
38  See generally Oxera, supra n 33.   
39  This point is also raised by Katz and Shapiro, supra n 23, 51: “A central question for market definition 
is how price-induced changes in the quantity demanded would affect the profits of the hypothetical 
monopolist. This is different from asking how a price increase would affect the profits earned by one 
of multiple competitors. One must go from evidence about the demand elasticity faced by a single 
competitor for one of its products to drawing inferences about the elasticity faced by a hypothetical 
monopolist controlling all of the products in the candidate market. In general, the elasticity of demand 
facing the hypothetical monopolist is less than that facing a single firm because the monopolist does 
not lose sales competing with itself.” 
40  See generally Oxera, supra n 33.   
41  See Katz and Shapiro, supra n 23 and Farrell and Shapiro, supra n 35.  
42  As shown by Daljord, Sørgard and Thomassen, supra n 34, the result of Katz and Shapiro is based on 
the standard critical loss expression for the case in which all prices are increased although Katz and 
Shapiro intend to focus on the case in which only one price is increased. If the latter approach is build 
into their model, it can be shown that if and only if the aggregate diversion ratio is larger than the 
actual loss, then the hypothetical monopolist would find a SSNIP profitable. 
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consequence, defendants might try to argue that – given the large margin – a price 
increase cannot be profitable and the candidate market therefore needs to be broadened. 
There are at least two reasons why such a story is necessarily incomplete. First, as 
shown in the preceding paragraph, high margins not only indicate a small critical loss 
but also a small actual loss and therefore very well allow the possibility that a price 
increase is profitable although the critical loss is small. 43 Second, high margins can be 
an indication of high market power due to price-insensitive customers. In other words, it 
is possible that firms have already raised price to the point where demand starts to 
become more responsive to price (i.e. they already charge monopoly prices) and the 
market should therefore be defined narrowly. However, if the market is broadened 
anyway, critical loss analysis might be confronted with the phenomenon of the 
‘Cellophane Fallacy’44 which challenges market definition exercises since the 1950s.45 In 
fact, as shown by Danger and Frech III46, the critical loss is indeed highly sensitive to 
the degree of market power at the starting point of the analyis. More pre-existing market 
power leads to smaller critical loss estimates, thus potentially broader market than they 
actually are. 
 Sixth, a last area of potential technical and methodological concern in the application 
of critical loss analysis is the presence of so-called two-sided markets or platform 
businesses. 47  In such markets, a platform has to deal with (at least) two different 
                                                          
43  According to Katz and Shapiro, supra n 23, 52, there are basically three possible explanations for 
large observed gross margins with claims that unit sales would be sensitive to a price increase 
imposed by the hypothetical monopolist. First, defendants could argue that the Lerner condition fails 
to provide information about the demand faced by the hypothetical monopolist because the firms in 
the candidate market are coordinating their prices rather than setting their prices independently. 
Second, defendants might argue that there is a ‘kink’ in the underlying demand curve, so that 
consumers would be very sensitive to price increases even though they are not sensitive to price 
decreases. Third, defendants might claim that there is a “kink” in the underlying cost curve, so that the 
marginal cost associated with additional output is much higher than the marginal cost associated with 
the last units actually produced. 
44  As described by the so-called cellophane fallacy, the SSNIP test is in danger of leading to too broad 
markets when it is applied in markets where market power is already exercised. The reason is simply 
that a firm with market power is expected to have raised prices already to the point where no further 
price increases are profitable (i.e., to the point where demand is elastic). Consequently, conducting the 
SSNIP test at prevailing prices would likely lead to the inclusion of products in the candidate market 
which would not have been part of it if the analysis had started at the competitive price level. 
Therefore, an application of the SSNIP test needs to identify the appropriate benchmark price against 
which to apply the hypothetical price increase. Historically, the cellophane fallacy is much older than 
the SSNIP test. It was first reported in a landmark antitrust case, United States vs. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co. (351 US 377 [1956]), in which the Court erroneously concluded that the only 
producer of cellophane, Du Pont, did not have market power because it measured the demand 
elasticity at the monopoly level and not at the competitive level. In fact, other products were only 
considered as substitutes by the customers because of the elevated prices of cellophane charged by Du 
Pont. In order to avoid the Cellophane Fallacy, several merger guidelines suggest that the prevailing 
market price should be replaced by a competitive price in the SSNIP or critical loss test, respectively, 
if there are indications that the prevailing price does not appear to be the competitive price. See 
International Competition Network, “ICN Report on Merger Guidelines” (2004), 9-11.  
45  See H Hovenkamp, “Analyzing Horizontal Mergers: Unilateral Effects in Product-Differentiated 
Markets”, University of Iowa Working Paper (2009), 10.  
46  KL Danger and HE Frech III, „Critical Thinking about „Critical Loss“ in Antitrust” (2001) 46 
Antitrust Bulletin 339-355.  
47 Generally speaking, a two-sided market can be characterised by a platform which has to serve two 
separate customer groups (located on two separate market sides) in order to be successful. The 
specific feature of such markets is that the utility a customer on the one side of the market realises 
depends on the number of customers on the other side, and vice versa (so-called ‘indirect’ or ‘cross-
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customer groups whose demands are interrelated and which must therefore both be 
taken into account in order to maximise profits. Given the existence of such ‘cross-
group’ or ‘indirect’ network effects, an analysis of the profit effect of a price increase 
for a product on side A of the platform cannot solely concentrate on the typical ‘higher 
margin’ / ‘lost margin’ trade-off on side A, but also has to consider that a reduction in 
demand on side A of the platform leads to a reduction in the demand and price on side B 
of the platform. Additionally, this reduction on side B has a feedback effect on side A of 
the platform which reduces demand on this side accompanied by price decreases. Given 
this key effect, it becomes immediately clear that the standard SSNIP test needs to be 
extended to both sides of the market in order to take account of the interdependency of 
demand and to avoid errors in market definition.48  
 For critical loss analysis, the existence of indirect network effects already feeds the 
intuition that the standard critical loss formulas derived in Section B. above need to be 
extended by the lost revenues from the complementary platform side and the feedback 
effects between both sides. Otherwise the negative profit effects of a price increase 
would likely be understated and the market would be defined too narrowly. 
Furthermore, with respect to the calculation of the actual loss it is, first, equally 
important to include the strength of the indirect network externalities into the equation. 
Second, it is important to remark that simple applications of, for instance, the Lerner 
index on one side of the market (as described in Section B. above) to estimate demand 
elasticity for the entire actual loss of the platform is equally error-prone and tends to 
lead to broader markets than they actually are. However, as shown by Evans and Noel49, 
it is possible to extend the simple version of the actual loss equation for an application 
in two-sided markets by basically including cross-side elasticities into the equation.    
2. Merger control  
In addition to market definition, critical loss analysis can also be applied in horizontal 
merger control to investigate the unilateral price effects of proposed mergers. In such a 
context, the relevant question is not whether a hypothetical monopolist would find it 
profitable to increase price by a certain percentage but rather whether the merging firms 
would be able to do so post-merger. If a comparison of actual loss and critical loss 
shows that the former exceeds the latter, the merged entity would not find such a price 
increase profitable; otherwise it would find it profitable. The result derived from such a 
critical loss analysis can then be used as one piece of evidence to answer the general 
question whether the merger is likely to cause significant anticompetitive effects or not.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
group’ network effects). A straightforward example for such a market is a heterosexual dating club, 
which has to attract both men and women to operate profitably. Another example is the credit card 
industry, in which the respective card-issuing firms need to attract both customers who own the card 
as well as shops who actually accept the card as a form of payment. Given the specifics of two-sided 
markets, a maximization of profits requests from the respective managing platform to consider not 
only the demands on both sides of the platform but also the interrelationships between these demands. 
The balancing of demands on both sides of the platform is typically implemented by imposing not 
only a price level but also a price structure which helps to take account of the different economic 
characteristics (such as demand elasticities etc.) on both sides and therefore their relative importance 
for the overall success of the platform. See, for instance, DS Evans, “Two-sided Market Definition”, 
Working Paper (2008); DS Evans and MD Noel, “The Analysis of Mergers that Involve Multisided 
Platform Businesses” (2008) 4 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 663–695; DS Evans, “The 
Antitrust Economics of Two-Sided Markets”, University of Chicago Working Paper (2002); L 
Filistrucchi, supra n 32, 4-9. 
48  See generally Evans, “The Antitrust Economics of Two-Sided Markets”, ibid.  
49  See generally Evans and Noel, supra n 47. 
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 Given this slightly different focus of critical loss analysis in a merger control context, 
the question how the respective standard calculations might be affected immediately 
suggests itself. In general, there are basically two different ways proposed in the 
literature. First, it is argued that the critical loss formula derived in Section B. above 
basically stays unchanged and the only difference in an application of critical loss 
analysis between market definition and merger control basically lies in the calculation 
of the actual loss. Second, it is argued that both the critical loss formula and the actual 
loss formula need to be adjusted in order to come to meaningful results in a merger 
context.   
 Focusing on the second approach first, Langenfeld and Li50 basically argue that an 
intuitive reason for a need to adjust the critical loss equation is that some of the sales 
lost by firm A due to an increase in price would be recaptured by its merging partner – 
firm B – and would therefore stay in the merged company A+B. Ceteris paribus, this 
effect tends to water down the impact of a price increase on lost sales and therefore 
indicates that the critical loss in a unilateral effects assessment has to be larger than the 
critical loss for a market definition assessment. This effect can be investigated formally 
as follows:51 
Consider that firms A and B plan to merge. When considering whether an increase in 
the price of firm A is profitable, the merged company will compare if 
      ABAB0BB0AA0AAA0 DQQMCPQQMCpP  
    B0BB0A0AA0 QMCPQMCP   (13)
is true. DAB is defined as the diversion ratio from firm A to firm B.52 Rearranging the 
terms of the inequality above and defining  
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leads to the following inequality 
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. (17)
                                                          
50 Langenfeld and Li, supra n 22. 
51 The model approach follows Langenfeld and Li, supra n 22, 336.  
52  The diversion ratio was introduced by Shapiro and is defined as ‘the fraction of sales lost by brand A 
that are captured by brand B’ in case the price for product A is increased by x%. Formally, the 
diversion ratio from A to B is the ratio of the cross-price elasticity of demand for A with respect to the 
price of B over the own elasticity of demand for A. To give a practical example: If we know that a 
certain increase in the price of butter leads to a switch of 33% of the demand to margarine, the 
diversion ratio is 0.33. In other words, the diversion ratio gives an indication of how close the two 
products are in the product space. If the diversion ratio is 1, a merger of products A and B would 
eliminate any kind of competition between the two products. If the diversion ratio is 0, a merger 
would not lead to a loss of competition. See C Shapiro, “Mergers with Differentiated Products”, US 
Department of Justice Speech Manuscript (1995).  
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The left side of inequality (17) is the critical loss (could-approach53, linear demand 
function) to be used in a unilateral effects analysis. A comparison with the critical loss 
for market definition AA
A
XM
X
 derived in Section B. above shows that the denominator 
of this expression is by ABA
0
B
0B D
P
P
M  smaller which leads to larger ratio as a whole. In 
other words, the adjusted critical loss for merger control applications is larger than the 
standard critical loss for market definition applications. Expression (17) further clarifies 
that the critical loss now also depends on the pre-merger margin of firm B, the relative 
price of the merging firms B and A as well as the diversion ratio between A and B. The 
relationship between the last two is shown in Figure 6 below for fixed MA = 0.6, MB = 
0.5 and XA = 0.05.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
53 As already mentioned in footnote 22 above, in a merger control context, the would-approach should be 
preferred as the key interest of the analyst lies in the profit-maximising price increase post-merger.  
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Fig. 6. Critical loss (could-approach, linear demand function) for different relative 
prices and diversion ratios (ranges 0-1.0 and 0-0.8) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 shows that the critical loss increases with the diversion ratio and the relative 
price of B to A. Both results are in line with economic intuition. The larger the diversion 
ratio between the two merging products, the closer are the two merging products in the 
product space and the larger is the fraction of the demand lost by A which is recaptured 
by B. Equally, the larger the relative price (B to A), the larger is the fraction of lost 
revenue firm A can regain by customers switching from A to B. Therefore, both effects 
underpin the argument that the critical loss has to be larger in a merger control exercise 
than in a market definition exercise. This implies that price increases which weren’t 
profitable in standard critical loss analysis can very well be profitable in critical loss 
analysis corrected for the specifics of horizontal merger control. However, Figure 6 
shows further that that the critical loss plane becomes discontinuous with some single 
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critical loss values reaching 250%. 54  As these very large values only appear for 
relatively large diversion ratios, Figure 6 shows a second graph with a restricted range 
for the diversion ratios to exclude the ‘outliers’. Generally, it can be concluded that 
reality checks are important in any application of critical loss analysis. A mechanic 
application of formulas might lead to serious problems when the results are put to 
practice.55  
 The second group of proposals with respect to necessary adjustments in critical loss 
analysis in merger control basically argues that the critical loss formulas derived in 
Section B. above stay unchanged and the only difference in an application of critical 
loss analysis in a merger control context lies in the estimation of the actual loss. How 
this estimation of the actual loss should be conducted recently triggered a lively 
discussion among antitrust experts which will be sketched in the next paragraphs.  
 Generally, commentators agree that it is essential in every merger application of 
critical loss analysis not only to get an understanding of how many sales a certain 
product loses in case of a price increase but also to what extent this lost demand will be 
recaptured by the merging competitor. As described in footnote 52 above, it is generally 
possible to approximate this effect by the use of diversion ratios (which might be easier 
to derive than cross-price elasticities 56 ). As a consequence, due to the diversion/ 
recapture effect, the actual loss calculation needs to be corrected for the diversion 
between the merging parties and the actual loss would therefore be smaller post-merger 
leading to a larger incentive of the merged entity to raise prices.  
 Apart from showing the importance of adjusting the actual loss equation to take 
account for the diversion/recapture effect, Langenfeld and Li57 identify a second aspect 
that needs to be taken into account. This effect refers to the price reactions of other non-
merging ‘outsider’ firms. In a market definition exercise, it is typically assumed that all 
firms in the candidate market are acting like a hypothetical monopolist and that all firms 
raise price by the same amount – consequently, the question of how other firms in the 
market respond to such an price increase is irrelevant. However, when using critical loss 
analysis in a merger control context, the reactions of other firms in the market to a price 
increase must be taken into account. As investigated in detail by Langenfeld and Li, 
there are three basic reaction possibilities: price increases, price decreases or no price 
changes. Typically, the loss of sales would be highest in the first case and lowest in case 
the competitors follow the price increase of the merged firm. The question of what is 
most profitable for the outsiders generally depend on various factors, however, in a 
differentiated product market, economic theory predicts that a price rise by the merged 
entity would typically create incentives for the outsider firms to unilaterally raise their 
price (absent any product repositioning issues). In such a scenario, the merged firm 
typically is expected to experience fewer losses of customers to competitors in the 
market than if all competitors kept their prices constant. As a consequence, it becomes 
more likely that a price increase is profitable and this must be included into the 
                                                          
54  Technically, the large critical losses simply result from the denominator in Equation (17) becoming 
very small. 
55  See RBB Economics, “Lost in Translation: The Use and Abuse of Diversion Ratios in Unilateral 
Effects Analysis”, RBB Brief 19 (2006). 
56 Technically, it can be expected that a merger with a direct competitor typically decreases the own-
price elasticity by an amount proportional to the cross-price elasticity with the respective competitor. 
57 Langenfeld and Li, supra n 22. 
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calculation of the actual loss to avoid an underestimation of the profitability of a certain 
price increase.58    
 Apart from the identification of these two key effects of critical loss analysis in a 
merger context – the ‘diversion/recapture’ effect and ‘reaction by outsider firms’ effect 
– a recent focal point of discussion is the more general question whether and how 
critical loss analysis can sensibly be applied in differentiated goods markets. Coate and 
Williams, for example, argue that the critical loss framework is generally inappropriate 
for such an analysis as it was explicitly developed for homogenous markets. For 
differentiated industries, however, they argue that equilibrium-based criteria are needed 
to undertake a proper analysis. 59  O’Brien and Wickelgren 60  as well as Farrell and 
Shapiro 61  develop this argument further by deriving critical loss conditions which 
impose the equilibrium conditions of particular economic models of differentiated 
products. In both approaches, it is argued that such an extension of basic critical loss 
analysis is needed to secure reliable results out of an application of critical loss analysis.  
Specifically, O’Brien and Wickelgren examine critical loss analysis using a standard 
Bertrand pricing model62 with differentiated products.63 Their key result shows that for a 
given degree of product substitutability between the products (i.e. a given cross-price 
elasticity or diversion ratio), larger margins make it less likely that the actual loss will 
exceed the critical loss from a price increase. This result holds under linear and constant 
elasticity demand and is determined by simple conditions which require estimation of 
                                                          
58 Given the importance of the behaviour of outsider firms, Langenfeld and Li, supra n 22, suggest to use 
the residual demand elasticity instead of the Marshallian demand elasticity in estimating the actual 
loss for the merged entity as the former takes the unilateral price increases of the outsiders into 
account. Given the fact that the residual demand is less elastic than the Marshallian demand, the actual 
loss of the merged entity would be smaller than would otherwise be the case.  
59  However, Daljord, supra n 36, shows that it is possible to extent the critical loss criterion by Harris 
and Simons to a version that neither relies on the equilibrium conditions of a particular model of 
competition nor demands product homogeneity. Specifically, Daljord focuses on critical loss analysis 
in case of two asymmetric products. He argues that standard critical loss analysis can lead to 
misleading results in such a case and develops an exact critical loss criterion which is derived for any 
demand structure and which is valid regardless of the industry pricing game, however, assumes 
constant returns to scale over the relevant range of production. The criterion is a simple function of 
sales, the margins, and the price sensitivity of each product in the candidate market.  
60  O’Brien and Wickelgren, supra n 3.  
61  Farrell and Shapiro, supra n 35.  
62  Instead of Bertrand models assumed by most commentators, an alternative way to model the actual 
loss in merger control would be to refer to a (dominant) firm with a (possibly competitive) fringe 
framework. In such a framework, an increase in price by the dominant firm will generally result in the 
fringe firms increasing production, “… so the residual quantity demanded from the dominant firm 
falls with an increase in price both because of the decreased quantity demanded (a shift along the 
demand curve) and because of the increase in the quantity supplied by the fringe firms. Thus, in order 
to get an estimate of whether such actions would be profitable, an estimate of the reaction curves of 
the remaining fringe firms to a price increase is needed in addition to the estimate of demand 
elasticity.” In order to be able to estimate the expected expansion by the fringe firms, data on prices, 
production, and excess capacity of the competitive firms are required. See International Competition 
Network, “The Role of Economists and Economic Evidence in Merger Analysis”, ICN Working Paper 
(2004), 7. 
63  However, as remarked by O’Brien and Wickelgren, supra n 3, the result that high margins tend to 
make post-merger price increases more likely also emerges from standard theories of competition 
among producers of homogenous products. 
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the cross-price elasticities (or diversion ratios) between the products of the merging 
parties, in addition to the merging firms’ margins.64  
However, both modelling approaches were in turn criticised by Scheffman and 
Simons.65 They argue that the key advantage of standard critical loss analysis is that it is 
‘just arithmetic’ and that it does not rely on any kind of particular model of competitive 
interaction and is therefore robust for potential model misspecifications. As a 
consequence, they argue against the use of these kinds of models and suggest using 
qualitative case-specific evidence to come to a reasonable conclusion on the definition 
of the market or the likely competitive effects of a particular merger.  
Although the view of Scheffman and Simons66 cannot be disregarded completely, it 
needs to be remarked that the fact that standard critical loss analysis is just arithmetic 
and does not allow the immediate conclusion that the returned results of such an 
analysis are always reliable and guide the decision into the right direction. As 
corroborated by Daljord, Sørgard & Thomassen67, there might be good reasons to apply 
equilibrium-based criteria, conditional on the particular model being appropriate in the 
industry. In other words, the particular specifics of the respective case should provide 
guidance whether a standard critical loss analysis can lead to reliable results or whether 
some form of economic model is needed to base the estimation of especially the actual 
loss on more solid grounds.   
 In general, it has to be pointed out that critical loss analysis in merger control can 
only be considered as a very simple form of merger simulation. Economists have 
developed more sophisticated ‘merger simulation tools’ to come to conclusions on the 
likely effects of a horizontal merger on market price.68 In general, these tools use a 
model of consumer demand and a model of competitive interaction to predict the price 
effects of a merger.69 In order to be able to apply such tools, market information, such as 
market shares and market demand elasticities, needs to be estimated as data input for the 
simulation of the effect of a merger-induced change in the ownership structure on 
market price. An especially helpful feature of merger simulation tools is that they allow 
simulating not only the post-merger prices but can also take account of changes in the 
cost structure (the so-called merger efficiencies) and antitrust-induced changes in the 
ownership structure (the so-called [structural] merger remedies). However, despite an 
increasing adoption of merger simulation tools in antitrust authorities and economic 
consultancies, the general suitability of such techniques is questioned by academics and 
practioners.70 Given the potential problems of merger simulations, Carlton71 views these 
                                                          
64  SX Moresi, SC Salop and J R Woodbury, “Implementing the Hypothetical Monopolist SSNIP Test 
With Multi-Product Firms” (2008) The Antitrust Source 1-8, generalized the critical loss criterion 
derived by Katz and Shapiro, supra n 23, allowing for multi-product firms and asymmetric products. 
65  D Scheffman and J Simons, “The State of Critical Loss Analysis: Let’s Make Sure We Understand the 
Whole Story” (2003) Antitrust Source 1-9. 
66  Scheffman and Simons, ibid. 
67  Daljord, Sørgard and Thomassen, supra n 34.   
68  For detailed overviews see G Werden and L Froeb, “Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal 
Mergers”, Working Paper (2007); American Bar Association, Market Power Handbook: Competition 
Law and Economic Foundations (Chicago, ABA Publishing, 2005).  
69 See J Hausman and G Leonard, “Economic Analysis of Differentiated Products Mergers Using Real 
World Data” (1997) 5 George Mason Law Review 321-344. 
70  See, for instance, C Peters, “Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulations: Evidence from the 
U.S. Airline Industry” (2006) 49 Journal of Law and Economics 627-649; M Weinberg, “The Price 
Effects of Horizontal Mergers” (2008) 4 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 733–447. 
71  See D Carlton, “Using Economics to Improve Antitrust Policy”, NBER Working Paper (2003), 7-11. 
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tools as a useful complement for the more direct ‘traditional’ approaches for merger 
analysis, which basically build on ‘natural experiments’ aiming at answering the 
question, “What happens to price when the number of competitors diminishes by one?” 
 The same conclusion would obviously apply for critical loss analysis which is even 
less sophisticated than merger simulation tools and typically does not provide the 
flexibility needed to reach a sufficiently good fit between modelling assumptions and 
market realities. So in case of merger control, it is even more obvious that critical loss 
analysis can only be considered as one piece of evidence amongst others. This is 
especially true because of the need to include non-price aspects of competition into a 
merger assessment. While probably not of equally great importance in market 
definition, merger control regularly has to cope with various forms of non-price 
competition as well as many other market specifics such as the role of coordinated 
effects, product repositioning, countervailing buyer power, entry barriers, merger 
efficiencies or the impact of the merger on innovation incentives which typically cannot 
be investigated in a sensible way by some kind of critical loss analysis.72    
E. APPLICATIONS OF CRITICAL LOSS ANALYSIS IN RECENT CASES 
Following the characterisation of standard critical loss analysis and its key properties 
and applications, it is the aim of this section to give an idea of practical applications of 
the method in recent antitrust cases. Generally, it is fair to say that critical loss analysis 
is frequently applied in antitrust cases in the United States 73  while its use in the 
European Union seems to be rather modest to date – at least as far as the published 
merger decisions of the European Commission suggest.74 
 In the following, two cases in which critical loss analysis played a significant role are 
described in greater detail. The first case is the proposed acquisition of Wild Oats 
Markets by Whole Foods Market75 which was investigated by the US Federal Trade 
Commission (‘FTC’) as well as (so far) two distinct US courts. The second case is the 
proposed merger by Ineos and Kerling76 which was investigated by the DG Competition 
of the European Commission (‘Commission’). 
                                                          
72  At least some of the mentioned market specifics are essential in deciding how long-lasting possible 
price increases would be. For example, even in case a critical loss analysis comes to the conclusion 
that a price increase of 15% would be profitable in the short-term, an assessment of merger 
efficiencies, product repositioning or market entry could conclude that these factors can be expected 
to develop strong countervailing powers in the medium- and long-term perspective to constrain the 
merged entity sufficiently.  
73  See MB Coate and JJ Simons, “Models, Mathematics and Critical Loss”, Working Paper (2009) for 
several further examples.  
74  This point of view is shared by Veljanovski, supra n 2, 14, who remarks that “[d]espite the increasing 
use of Critical Loss in US antitrust, it has been ignored by the EC Commission. In the UK the concept 
has been used, and identified as a useful quantitative technique.”  
75 Federal Trade Commission, Plaintiff, v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., and Wild Oats Markets, Inc. 
(United States District Court for the District of Columbia), Civ. No. 07-cv-01021-PLF, FTC File No. 
071 0114, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710114/0710114.shtm (accessed on 21 August 
2009). 
76  Case No. COMP/M.4734 - INEOS/Kerling [2008] C(2008) 379 final. 
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1. Whole Foods Market and Wild Oats Markets (2007) 
In the proposed acquisition of Wild Oats Markets, Inc. by Whole Foods Market, Inc. 77 – 
the second largest and the largest supermarket chain focusing on premium natural and 
organic products in the United States – market definition was the focal point of interest 
and dispute. The FTC basically argued that Whole Foods and Wild Oats were part of so-
called ‘premium natural and organic supermarkets’ (PNOS) distinct from conventional 
supermarkets and asserted that such conventional supermarkets do not constrain PNOS 
in nearly the same way that Whole Foods and Wild Oats constrain each another. As a 
consequence, the FTC concluded that the proposed acquisition would lead – in many 
geographic markets – to a merger to monopoly and would therefore substantially lessen 
competition in the operation of PNOS. The FTC therefore decided to challenge the 
proposed acquisition.78  
 In the subsequent district court opinion the judge focused mainly on the ability of 
conventional stores to constrain the pricing of the post-merger Whole Foods and 
concluded – largely relying on the testimony of the defendant’s economic experts – that 
Whole Foods would not be able to sustain a price increase in a properly defined product 
market. As critical loss analysis was a key tool in the defendant’s reasoning, this part of 
the much more detailed testimonies will be sketched in more detail in the following.  
The key economic expert hired by the defendants, David Scheffman, applied a 
standard critical loss analysis (could-approach) using both a 5 % and 1 % SSNIP and 
basically concluded that actual loss would substantially exceed critical loss at either 
level of price increase.79 Since there was no evidence in the record to determine cross-
elasticity of demand between PNOS and conventional stores, Scheffman based his 
critical loss analysis on qualitative evidence he received from reviewing market studies. 
These studies showed that, first, grocery shoppers are price sensitive, second, Whole 
Foods and Wild Oats customers shift purchases between PNOS and other supermarkets 
(and can do so costlessly), third, most Whole Foods and Wild Oats customers frequently 
shop at other grocery stores, fourth, other supermarkets compete vigorously for Whole 
Foods and Wild Oats customers, and fifth, Whole Foods (and Wild Oats to a lesser 
degree) regularly price check other supermarkets to gauge their pricing and product 
assortments. Due to this collection of qualitative evidence, Scheffman concluded that 
the actual loss has to be substantially larger than the critical loss. As a consequence, 
price increases for the merged entity would not pay due to the presence of a sufficient 
amount of ‘marginal customers’ and the relevant market therefore is at least PNOS 
together with conventional supermarkets.  
 The key economic expert hired by the FTC, Kevin Murphy, however argued that 
Scheffman’s methodology of comparing the critical loss for a hypothetical monopolist 
with qualitative evidence on price sensitivity of customers is not reliable. In particular, 
                                                          
77  FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc. and Wild Oats Mkt., Inc., No. 07-1021, 2007  WL 2377000, at 16 
(D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2007). See also W Baer and D Feinstein, “Changing Emphasis: How Whole Foods 
Advances the FTC’s Efforts to Transform Merger Litigation”, Arnold & Porter LLP Working Paper 
(2008). 
78  C Varner and H Cooper, “Product Markets in Merger Cases: The Whole Foods Decision” (2007) The 
Antitrust Source 6. 
79  The entire analysis by Scheffman can be subdivided into three areas. In addition to the critical loss 
analysis described in greater detail above, he also analyzed the source of sales for new Whole Foods 
Market stores and found that its sales were generated to a large extent from other supermarkets 
regardless of the existence of a nearby PNOS. Additionally, Scheffman analyzed Whole Foods and 
Wild Oats prices and found no variation in Whole Foods or Wild Oats pricing based on the presence 
or absence of the other. See Varner and Cooper, ibid. 
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Murphy brought forward that Scheffman’s analysis fails to recognise that the 
fundamental issue is how the competitive constraints on the merged entity will change 
as a result of the acquisition, not whether Whole Foods currently competes, at some 
level, with other firms in addition to Wild Oats. Furthermore, Murphy stated that a 
correct form of critical loss analysis that uses precisely the evidence cited by Scheffman 
indicates that the proposed acquisition would have significant anticompetitive effects. 
Additionally, Murphy remarked that Scheffman’s analysis focuses to a large extent on 
pricing from Whole Foods’ perspective, thereby missing the anticompetitive motive of 
the closure of many Wild Oats stores following the acquisition.  
Interestingly, in his critical assessment of Scheffman’s analysis, Murphy80 frequently 
refers to the academic literature on critical loss analysis. One key argument he brings 
forward is the general problem with the accuracy of critical loss analysis in industries 
with low margins such as supermarkets. Furthermore, Murphy doubts that standard 
critical loss analysis is of great help in this case and argues that a meaningful critical 
loss analysis in such a case has to investigate “… how much profit the other party (in 
the case of a merger) or other parties (in the case of the SSNIP analysis) gains from an 
increase in price by one of the firms. The loss in sales from increasing price when each 
seller acts unilaterally is already factored in to setting the existing (pre-SSNIP) price.” 81 
Based on a very simple model, Murphy intends to show why the hypothetical 
monopolist of the merged firm would typically have an incentive to raise price above 
the current level (absent other factors such as entry): “The merged firm gets to capture 
this profit increase that would otherwise go to an independent seller, so the gains from 
raising prices are greater.”82 Based on this general so-called ‘critical diversion’ argument, 
Murphy argues that Whole Foods did not only have an added incentive to raise price but 
also an added incentive to close Wild Oats stores post-merger.  
In the end, the district court did not follow the arguments of the FTC expert but 
agreed with Scheffman’s conclusion that “… because so many people are cross-
shopping for natural and organic foods and are marginal rather than core customers, the 
actual loss from a [small but significant and nontransitory price increase] would exceed 
the critical loss”.83 The court further concluded that the FTC’s market definition was 
flawed because it focused on “core” or “committed” customers rather than “marginal” 
customers who are of key interest in the market definition exercise which has to assess 
the question whether enough customers would switch enough of their purchases that a 
post-merger price increase or quality decline would be unprofitable for Whole Foods84 
(see Baer and Feinstein85 for possible wider implications of the Whole Foods decision).  
                                                          
80  FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc. and Wild Oats Mkt., Inc., supra n 75, “Exhibit 2 - Public Version of 
the Rebuttal Expert Report of Kevin M. Murphy, Ph.D.” (2007).   
81  Ibid, 15. 
82  Ibid, 17. 
83  FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc. and Wild Oats Mkt., Inc., No. 07-1021, 2007  WL 2377000, at 16 
(D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2007). See also W Baer and D Feinstein, “Changing Emphasis: How Whole Foods 
Advances the FTC’s Efforts to Transform Merger Litigation”, Arnold & Porter LLP Working Paper 
(2008). 
84  Comparing Scheffman’s and Murphy’s approaches, one crucial difference is that the former analysis 
depends only on the marginal loss of sales, while the latter used the average loss of customers. As 
explained in detail by Murphy, supra n 80, focusing on the average behaviour of customers is 
appropriate because a core of committed customers would continue to shop at PNOS stores despite a 
significant price increase post-merger. 
85  Baer and Feinstein, supra n 83. 
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 Interestingly, in a split decision in July 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia reversed the decision of the district court that determined that 
the FTC failed to demonstrate sufficient possibility of anticompetitive effects of the 
acquisition.86 Judge Janice Rogers Brown came to the conclusion that the district court 
committed an abuse of discretion and an error in considering only marginal consumers, 
and not core consumers, in performing its market analysis.87 Although the decision was 
criticised by economists – arguing that the SSNIP idea is based on marginal rather than 
core customers88 – the case remains undecided to date and already raised the question 
about possible consequences for the already merged parties in case the final court 
decision comes to the conclusion that the relevant market in this case has to be PNOS 
only.89  
 Independent from the question how the case will finally be decided, the first court 
decision has at least shown that the critical loss concept can be applied successfully in 
court even without the possibility to actually estimate the actual loss. A collection of 
anecdotal evidence can be sufficient to convince the court of a certain market definition.    
2. Ineos and Kerling (2008) 
In Ineos/Kerling90, the Commission had to investigate the production of ‘Suspension 
Polyvinyl Chloride’ (S PVC) as well as related products in the UK as well as 
Continental Europe. The proposed merger basically would have led to a merger to 
monopoly if the UK were found to be the relevant market (and not the broader market 
of the European Union). As part of geographical market definition, the Commission 
basically had to answer the question to what extent S PVC from Continental Europe can 
be seen as a substitute for S PVC produced in the UK. The question was especially 
important after UK customers expressed concerns with regard to the flexibility and 
reliability of supply, short lead times and precise timing of deliveries from sources 
outside the UK. The Commission approached the question by investigating, firstly, from 
a demand-side perspective, the sourcing and switching patterns of these customers, and 
                                                          
86  FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., No. 07-6276 (D.C.Cir. July 29, 2008). 
87  “In sum, the district court believed the antitrust laws are addressed only to marginal consumers. This 
was an error of law, because in some situations core consumers, demanding exclusively a particular 
product or package of products, distinguish a submarket. The FTC described the core PNOS 
customers, explained how PNOS cater to these customers, and showed these customers provided the 
bulk of PNOS’s business. The FTC put forward economic evidence – which the district court ignored 
– showing directly how PNOS discriminate on price between their core and marginal customers, thus 
treating the former as a distinct market. Therefore, we cannot agree with the district court that the FTC 
would never be able to prove a PNOS submarket. We do not say the FTC has in fact proved such a 
market, which is not necessary at this point. To obtain a preliminary injunction under § 53(b), the FTC 
need only show a likelihood of success sufficient, using the sliding scale, to balance any equities that 
might weigh against the injunction.” FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., ibid, 20.  
88  However, as discussed in Section C. above, the FTC argument can be valid if the customers of Whole 
foods can be separated into inelastic core customers and elastic marginal customers and it would be 
profitable for the merged entity to sacrifice the marginal customers in order to exploit the core 
customers. This is also acknowledged by Hovenkamp, supra n 45, 8: “If the increased profits that 
Whole Foods increased from the loyal core group of customers was greater than the revenue that it 
lost from the price sensitive marginal customers, and if this price increase were of sufficient 
magnitude, then the price increase would be profitable and the narrower market definition 
appropriate.”  
89  See K Forrest and S Jebejian, “Can we be forced to unwind our merger?”, Cravatz, Swaine & Moore 
LLP Memo (2009).  
90 Ineos/Kerling, supra n 76. 
 29
secondly, from the supply-side point of view, to what extent Continental European 
suppliers would be in a position to defeat a hypothetical price increase in the UK.   
 To answer the latter question, the Commission explicitly used a critical loss approach 
as one empirical method. On the basis of disaggregated data collected from the parties 
during the market investigation, the Commission estimated the critical loss for the year 
2006 for both, the profit-maximization method (would-approach) and the break-even 
method (could-approach). The results of the exercise are presented in the following 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2: The Commissions’ critical loss estimates in Ineos/Kerling 
 Would-approach Could-approach 
 Linear Iso-elastic   
   5%  10%   5%  10%   5% 10% 
Variable cost 
Hypothesis 1 
86,754 124,553 97,866 149,071 108,026 173,507 
Variable cost 
Hypothesis 2 
53,724 86,446 58,421 99,446 61,156 107,448 
Unit: tons (t); Data Source: de la Mano and Amelio91 
 
As shown in Table 2, the Commission did not only take account of the two methods to 
calculate the critical loss and considered two alternative price increase assumptions, but 
also applied two different variable cost hypotheses with the first one being the variable 
costs provided by the parties, and the second one deducting some of the variable costs 
which in fact were considered as fixed costs by the Commission. The substantial 
differences in the critical losses for both hypotheses show the general importance of the 
variable cost estimate that enters the critical loss analysis. The same conclusion is true – 
as already shown in Section C. above – for assumptions with respect to the general 
calculation method applied and the functional form of demand. For example, for the 
second hypothesis, the critical loss estimates lie between 10.7% (would-approach, 5% 
price increase, linear demand) and 12.2% (could-approach, 5% price increase) of the 
UK market size (which was around 500,000 tons in 2006 following a ballpark figure 
given in the decision of the Commission). 
 In a second step, the Commission had to derive an estimate of the actual loss of the 
merged entity in the event of a unilateral price increase of a certain percentage. 
However, the estimations of the inverse residual demand function undertaken by the 
Commission showed that the coefficient on the inverse elasticity of demand was in 
practically all tested specifications statistically insignificant and the values were not 
robust to slight modifications in the specification.92 Furthermore, standard statistical 
tests showed that the instruments used to estimate the actual loss were too weak to draw 
strong conclusions from them.93 
Given the inconclusiveness of the critical loss analysis, the Commission did not use 
its results and investigated the open question of supply-side market definition by using 
other forms of evidence such as the current level of imports, transport costs and reported 
                                                          
91  See M De La Mano and A Amelio, “M.4734 Ineos/Kerling. A story of an empirical exercise”, 
Presentation at the ACE Conference (2008).  
92  As argued by Small, one key reason for the insignificant results might have been the use of data 
aggregated by customer size in combination with a lack of firm-specific cost- or demand-shocks. This 
raises the question whether the Commission would have been able to derive robust results for the 
estimation of the actual loss if it would have used less aggregated data. See I Small, “Ineos/Kerling”, 
Presentation at the ACE Conference (2008).  
93  See de la Mano and Amelio, supra n 91.  
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planned capacity expansions compared with demand growth, and the assessment of 
barriers to expansion in the UK.94 
 Summarizing the case, the course of action by the Commission can be considered as 
sensible and correct. The case and data situation allowed a critical loss analysis and the 
Commission conducted the respective calculations considering its important properties. 
After realising that the results are not robust enough, the Commission decided to base 
its decision on other forms of evidence. This course of action was especially praised by 
Verboven95 who argued that in other antitrust cases insignificant results have been (tried 
to) use(d) as evidence. From this perspective, the Commission was right not only in 
excluding critical loss analysis from the list of evidence in the case at hand but also in 
nevertheless including their attempt to apply critical loss analysis in the final decision. 
This can not only be seen as a signal that the Commission is able and willing to use 
such tools (if possible and suitable) but more importantly, that it is aware of the 
problems and drawbacks and only consider the results as evidence if they are 
sufficiently robust. Such an approach raises the acceptance of the economic analysis 
conducted by the Commission.  
F. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The last couple of years have seen an increasing interest in critical loss analysis, both, in 
academia and in practice. This development is documented by various research papers, 
high-level exchanges between antitrust experts as well as an increasing number of case 
decisions – in the United States as well as in Europe – which make use of some form of 
critical loss analysis.  
 In this context, it was the aim of this article to describe the general method of critical 
loss analysis, to assess important properties of the concept, to show how critical loss 
analysis has to differ between market definition exercises and the evaluation of the 
competitive effects of horizontal mergers and to discuss applications of critical loss 
analysis in recent cases.   
As a general result it can be said that an application of critical loss analysis in practice 
is often not as straightforward as the initial presentation of the general theoretical 
concept might have suggested. In fact, the method has to be applied with great care in 
order to receive meaningful results. On the one hand, it was shown that the critical loss 
might be sensitive to changes in the calculation method as well as the underlying 
demand and cost functions. On the other hand, the success of a critical loss analysis 
critically depends on the accuracy of the estimation of the actual loss. As indicated by 
both high-level theoretical exchanges (sketched partly in Section D.) and the review of 
two recent antitrust cases (sketched in Section E.), this often turns out to be the key 
challenge in a critical loss analysis.  
Critical loss analysis generally receives its attractiveness from the fact that “… it is 
easily calculated and requires amazingly little information.”96 On the one hand, this can 
be considered as an advantage of the concept; however, on the other hand, it cannot 
come as a surprise that such a simple tool is unable to fully absorb any type of market 
                                                          
94  As shown by de la Mano and Amelio, ibid, the Commission also undertook a so-called natural 
experiment in which it assessed the effect of an unplanned outage on Ineos plants in mid 2004. The 
results of the experiment suggest that both Kerling and Importers are in a position to swiftly react to 
any attempts of Ineos to constraint output so as to increase prices. 
95  See F Verboven, “Ineos/Kerling. Assessment of the relevant geographic market for a plastic resin. The 
impact of imports on a national market”, Presentation at the ACE Conference (2008).  
96  Veljanovski, supra n 2, 14. 
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specification which might be present (and important) in a certain case. As a 
consequence, it is essential before conducting a critical loss analysis to check whether 
the market specifics as well as the data situation at hand can expect critical loss analysis 
to result in reliable results. Furthermore, it is advisable to view the results of critical loss 
analysis as one piece of evidence whose plausibility needs to be cross-checked with 
other evidence derived, for instance, from natural experiments or customer surveys. If 
these restrictions are taken into account, critical loss analysis can be a helpful method in 
antitrust cases especially to define the relevant market or even to get a first impression 
on the competitive effects of a proposed horizontal merger. The long-term success of 
the method, however, will nevertheless depend on the successfulness of its application 
in court: “The proof of the pudding is in the eating.”      
